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Abstract 
Buss, S.R., The undecidability of k-provability, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 53 (1991) 
75-102. 
The k-provability problem is, given a first-order formula 4 and an integer k, to determine if @ 
has a proof consisting of k or fewer lines (i.e., formulas or sequents). This paper shows that the 
k-provability problem for the sequent calculus is undecidable. Indeed, for every r.e. set X 
there is a formula @(I) and an integer k such that for all n, $(SnO) has a proof of Sk sequents 
if and only if n E X. 
1. Introduction 
The concept of the length of a proof is important because it provides a measure 
of the difficulty of proving a given theorem in a given formal system. There are 
two common ways to measure the length of a proof; namely, to count the number 
of formulas or inferences in the proof or to count the number of symbols 
appearing in the proof. It is important to note that knowing the number of 
formulas in a proof does not give a bound on the number of symbols since the 
formulas may be very long; in particular, the terms used in the proof could be 
large. For this paper, the length of a proof will be defined to be the number of 
distinct lines in the proof, where a line is either a formula or, in the sequent 
calculus, a sequent. The k-provability problem for a first-order theory is, given a 
formula A and an integer k, to determine if A has a proof with k or fewer lines. 
The motivations for this paper arose out of work on Kreisel’s conjecture’ [7] 
that if Peano arithmetic PA proves A(P0) with a proof of Sk formulas for all n 
then PA proves (Vx) A(x). Parikh [ll] showed that this is true for a variant PA* 
Supported in part by NSF Grant DMS-8701828. 
’ It is not clear to this author whether Professor Kreisel ever conjectured this or merely posed it as a 
problem. At any rate, Kreisel’s conjecture was the original motivation for all the work outlined in this 
introduction. 
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of PA where addition and multiplication are three-place relations. He did this by 
first showing that if A is a formula and k E N then there is an a priori bound I such 
that if A has a proof of Sk lines then it has a proof of Sk lines in which each 
formula contains S1 logical connectives - the bound I is a function of k and the 
logical complexity of A. Hence when searching for a proof of length Sk we can 
control the logical complexity of the formulas appearing in the proof; however, 
the terms appearing in the proof might be arbitrarily complicated. For his result 
on PA*, Parikh then exploited the fact that PA* has only one (unary) function 
symbol to show that the k-provability problem for PA* is definable in Presburger 
arithmetic and decidable. 
A proof analysis is a partial description of a proof which describes the proof as 
a directed acyclic graph with a node for each formula (or sequent) in the proof. 
Each node is labelled with the rule of inference or axiom scheme which is used to 
derive the corresponding formula; incoming edges are ordered to specify which 
nodes represent which hypothesis of the inference. In short, a proof analysis 
specifies everything about the proof except the actual formulas in the proof. 
Every proof clearly has a proof analysis, but not all proof analyses correspond to 
proofs. Since first-order systems typically have only a finite number of axiom 
schemes and rules of inference, there are, for fixed k, only finitely many possible 
proof analyses for proofs of length k. Hence the k-provability problem can be 
reduced to the problem of, given a formula A and a proof analysis, determining if 
A has a proof with that proof analysis. 
Farmer [2, l] showed that if the substitution axiom is modified then the 
k-provability problem for PA is decidable; he emphasized the fact that finding the 
terms to flesh out a proof analysis is a version of second-order unification. 
Second-order unification was shown to be undecidable by Goldfarb [4]. KrajiEek 
and Pudlak [6] showed that for the sequent calculus LK it is undecidable whether 
a given formula has a proof with a given proof analysis. Orevkov had earlier 
proved a similar result [lo]. Other work related to Kreisel’s conjecture has been 
done by Richardson [12], Miyatake [S, 91 and Yukami [14, 151; see KrajiEek [5] 
for a more complete survey. M. Baaz has recently announced a proof of Kreisel’s 
conjecture. 
The main result of this paper is: 
Main Theorem 1. Let LK be Gentzen’s sequent calculus with a unary function 
symbol S, a binary function symbol and infinitely many binary relation symbols. 
For every recursively enumerable set X there is a formula A(x) and an integer k 
such that for all n, n E X if and only if +A(S”O) has an LK-proof with Sk distinct 
sequents. 
Hence the k-provability problem is undecidable for LK. The main theorem also 
holds for LK,, i.e., for LK augmented with equality axioms. It is permissible for 
there to be additional function and predicate symbols besides the ones required in 
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the hypothesis of the Main Theorem. The hypothesis that there be infinitely many 
binary relation symbols can be weakened to require only some bounded number 
of binary relation symbols; the precise number required depends on the size of a 
diophantine equation which defines an r.e. complete set. 
There are of course many ways to formalize first-order logic other than the 
sequent calculus. Unfortunately, our proof does not seem to apply immediately to 
all usual first-order logics; however, our technique could probably be adapted to a 
lot of other specific first-order logics. It would be desirable to improve our 
methods in this paper to be readily applicable to a wide range of formalizations of 
first-order logic. 
M. Baaz has announced an approach towards proving Kreisel’s conjecture; but 
the details have not been fully worked out yet. Baaz’s method avoids the 
undecidability of k-provability for the Gentzen sequent calculus firstly by 
translating proofs into a Hilbert-style e-calculus and secondly by circumventing 
the need to solve the k-decidability problem for the e-calculus. 
In Section 2 below we introduce a variant of second-order unification and show 
that it is undecidable. In Section 3 we review the sequent calculus and develop a 
tool called the ‘logical flow graph’ for analyzing sequent proofs. In Section 4 we 
prove the Main Theorem. 
2. Undecidability of second-order unification with partial substitution 
Goldfarb [4] proved that second-order unification is undecidable; see 
KrajiEek-Pudlak [6] for a simplified proof. We show here that a variant of 
second-order unification which allows partial substitution is also undecidable. 
First some notation: a, b, c, . . . , possibly with subscripts, are first-order 
variables (not metavariables); S is a unary function symbol and 0 is a binary 
function symbol; both S and 0 act on first-order objects. Other function symbols 
may be present and will not affect the results. The usual conventions on 
parentheses and term formation apply; we will usually omit parentheses and it is 
understood that 0 associates from right to left. Symbols r, s, t, . . . will be used to 
denote first-order terms. Greek letters (Y, p, y will be second order variables 
which will range over first-order terms. Finally, the symbols p, u, t will be used 
to denote second-order terms built from S, 0 and first- and second-order 
variables. Note that a, b, c, S, 0, a, /3, y are symbols of a formal language 
whereas r, s, t, p, CT, y are metasymbols. For k 3 0, we write Skp to denote the 
term consisting of S applied k times to p; e.g., S”a is SSSa. 
If r and s are first-order terms we write r(s/a) to denote the result of replacing 
every occurrence of a in r by the term s. Similarly, r(sllu,, sJu2) denotes the 
simultaneous substitution of s1 and s2 for a, and u2. Note that this is not in 
general the same as ~(s,/u,)(sJu~) if u2 occurs in s,. A second-order unification 
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problem is a finite set of equations 
for i=l,..., m. Recall that ail and &, are specific first- and second-order 
variables and pj and oj are metavariables for second-order terms. A solution to 
the second-order unification problem is an assignment of first-order terms to 
second-order variables such that, when all the second-order variables are replaced 
by their assigned terms, the equalities become true. For example, the unification 
problem consisting of the two equations P(a obla) = y 0 b and y(Su/u) = Sy has as 
unique solution y = a and /3 = a. 
We shall write r(s//u) to denote the result of a partial substitution of s for a in 
r. Actually, r(s//u) by itself is not uniquely defined and represents one of finitely 
many possible terms; we shall use this notation only in an equation of the form 
r(s//u) = t. 
Such an equation is true if and only if c can be obtained by replacing some 
(perhaps all or none) of the u’s in r by s. A second-order unijication problem with 
partial substitution is a finite set of equations of the form 
forj=l,. . . , m and a solution to this system of equations is an assignment of 
first-order terms to second-order variables that makes all of the equations true. 
For example, /3(u oh//u) = y ob and y(Sa//a) = Sy has an infinite number of 
solutions: (1) p = y = a and (2) y = S“a and /3 = (S”a) 0 b for k = 0, 1,2, . . . . To 
see this, note that the only solutions to the second equations are y = Ska for 
k 3 0. 
Theorem 2. The second-order unification problem with partial substitution is 
undecidable. 
In [4] and [6] second-order unification (without partial substitution) is shown 
undecidable by use of Matijacevic’s theorem; we shall use a similar technique to 
prove Theorem 2. In order to express the solvability of a diophantine equation as 
a second-order unification problem with partial substitution, we need to have a 
representation for integers and a way to force the correctness of addition and 
multiplication. A term of the form Sku will represent the nonnegative integer k. 
The following equation can be used to guarantee that /I represents an integer: 
(1) p(Sa//a) = SP. 
The only solutions to (1) are /3 = Sku for k 2 0. To prove this note that either 
/3 = a or /3 = S/3, where /3r is a solution to P1(Su//a) = S/3,. Arguing inductively 
shows /3 = Sku for some k 2 0. 
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To express addition we need a set of equations whose only solutions are 
fll = SkIa, pz = Sk2a, p3 = Sk1+k2a. This is accomplished by: 
(2) (i) /3j(Sda) = Spj, j = 1, 2, 3, 
(4 /Whlla) = P3, 
(iii) B1(W2//a) = SP3. 
By (2.i), pi = S kfa for j = 1, 2, 3. By (2.ii), depending on whether the substitution 
is performed, either k3 = ki + k2 or k3 = k,. By (2.iii), either k3 = kl + k2 or 
k3 + 1 = k,. Hence, k3 = kl + k2. 
Multiplication is more complicated. Consider the following set of equations: 
(3) (i) Pj(Sa//a) = SrS,, j = 1, 2, 3, 
(ii) P,(SWb) = S/L 
(iii) &(Sa’//a’) = S/3;, j = 1, 3, 
(iv) P;(Sb ‘/lb’) = S/3:, 
(V) bj(a’//a) = Sj, j = 1, 3, 
(vi) B,(b’//b) = Pi, 
(vii) &@//a) = P4, 
(viii) cu(&//a, Sbllb, Pi//a’, Sb’flb’, aoboa’ob’oc//c) =/33~~4~~j~~~~~, 
(ix) Ly(P;//a, Sb’//b, a//a’, b//b’, a’0 b’ 0 c//c) = /3;0 Pi0 (Y. 
(Recall that 0 associates from right to left.) Any solution to (3.i)-(3.vii) must 
have pj = S&a and /3,! = Ssa’ for j = 1, 2, 3 and have p4 = Sk26 and /?; = Sk2b’. We 
need to show that (3.viii) and (3.ix) are also satisfiable if and only if kl . k2 = k3. 
In fact we claim that the only solution has a equal to 
where k, . k2 = kg. 
It is obvious that when k, . k, = k3 this value for a is a solution with all possible 
substitutions being made. It remains to see that this is the only possible solution. 
Suppose that values have been assigned to a and the p’s which satisfy the 
equations. First of all, I_Y might be set equal to the term c; in this case k, = k3 = 0. 
Otherwise, a! must be of the form 
This follows from equation (3.viii) since we can write (Y uniquely in the form 
PI”P20P30’ - *opt and because of the form of the partial substitutions. From 
/3, = Sk’a and p3 = Sksa it follows that p, must be either Sk3a or Sk3-kla. Similarly 
p2 must be either Skza or Sk2-‘a, and similarly for p3 and p4. Thus we have m, 
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and rn; are either k3 or k3 - kl but not necessarily equal, and IZ~ and n; are k2 or 
k2 - 1 and again not necessarily equal. Furthermore, (Ye satisfies the equation 
a,(/3,lla, Sbllb, /3;lla’, Sb’llb’, a0 boa’0 b’~cllc) 
=S”la~S”‘b~S”ia’~S”ib’~cu, 
which is identical in form to (3.viii). Reasoning inductively shows that (Y must be 
of the form 
S”‘a~S”‘b~S”ia’~S”ib’~. .~S”~a~S”~b~S”~a’~S”~b’~c 
where ml and rn; are k3 or k3 - kl, n, and n; are k2 or kZ- 1, mi+, is mi or 
mi - kl, ml+, is ml or m] -k,, ni+l is ni or ni - 1, n:,, is ni or nl - 1, and 
m, = n, = rn: = n: = 0. Note that in each case the first choice of values holds when 
the corresponding instance of the substitution is not carried out; when the 
substitution is made, the second value applies. 
Now consider the fact that equation (3.ix) is also satisfied. The right-hand side 
of the equation has the form 
The substitution must case the first a, 6, a’, and b’ of (Y to be replaced by SkIa’, 
Sb’, a and b respectively and thus k3=ml + kl, k2=nl + 1, ml = ml, and 
n, = ni. Furthermore a2 satisfies the equation 
cr&%lla, Sb’llb, alla', b/b', a'ob'ocllc)=S"ia'~S"ib'~~, 
which, by the same reasoning, implies that rn; = m2 + k,, ni = n2 + 1, m2 = m;, 
n2 = ni. Continuing inductively we have that ml = rn; = k3 - kl, ItI = n; = k2 - 1, 
mi+l = mi+i ’ cm,-ki and ni+l=n:+l= ni - 1, so mi = k, . ni for all i and k3 = 
k, . kZ. 
We have established that equation (3) correctly prescribes multiplication; 
however, the last two equations allow simultaneous partial substitutions in five 
variables and our definition of unification problems did not allow equations 
involving simultaneous ubstitutions. Fortunately, equation (3.viii) can easily be 
replaced by five single partial substitutions using new intermediate variables and 
equation (3.ix) can be equivalently replaced by two equations 
a(a”//a’, b’llb’) = CY’, 
&@;//a, Sb’llb, alla”, b//b”, a’0 b’~cllc) = /3~0/3;0 LY 
and these two simultaneous partial substitutions can be replaced by seven 
equations using more intermediate variables. 
Given the above equations for defining the integers and addition and 
multiplication it is easy to effectively transform any diophantine equation into a 
second-order unification problem with partial substitution so that the unification 
problem has a solution if and only if the diophantine equation has a zero. So 
The undecidability of k-provability 81 
Theorem 2 now follows from Matijacevic’s theorem. The proof above establishes 
a stronger version of Theorem 2; namely, for any r.e. set X there is a set 52 of 
partial substitution equations such that, for all n, II E X if and only if Q U {PI = 
YO} has a solution. 
For our proof of the undecidability of k-provability we shall use a restricted 
version of the unification problem with partial substitution: 
Definition. A partial substitution satisfies the special restriction if it is of the form 
#I(s//a) = o where s is neither a second-order variable nor the first-order variable 
a. 
The above partial substitution equations did not all satisfy the special 
restriction, but it is easy to modify them so that they do. First, equation (2.ii) can 
be replaced by p1(SSp2//u) = SSP 3 and the three equations still define addition. 
In equations (3.viii) and (3.ix), if p1 and /3; are replaced by Sp, and S/3; then the 
equations obey the special restriction and define the property (k, + l)& = k3. 
Now since multiplication can be defined by xy = z G (x + 1)y = z + y, 
Matijacevic’s theorem implies: 
Theorem 3. The second-order unification problem with partial substitution under 
the special restriction is r.e.-complete. Indeed, for any r.e. set X there is a set Sz of 
partial substitution equations satisfying the special restriction such that, for all n, 
n E X if and only if !2 U {/I1 = YO} has a solution. 
3. The sequent calculus 
The sequent calculus is a formulation of the first-order logic due to Gentzen; 
this section contains a brief review (see [13] for a detailed exposition) and proves 
some lemmas needed for the proof of the Main Theorem. 
The sequent calculus uses the logical symbols A, v ,1, 3, 3 and V; it has free 
variables denoted a, b, c, . . . and bound variables denoted x, y, z, . . . . Terms are 
formed from constant symbols, free variables and function symbols; semiterms are 
like terms but may also contain bound variables. Formulas are defined as usual 
with the proviso that only bound variables may be quantified and only free 
variables may appear free. Semiformulas are defined similarly except both free 
and bound variables may occur free in a semiformula; note that in general a 
subformula of a formula is actually a semiformula. A sequent is a line of the form 
A, ,..., Ak+B1 ,..., B, 
where the Ai’s and Bi’s are formulas; its intended meaning is /jiAi 3 Vi Bi. We 
permit k or I to be zero. A (possibly empty) series of formulas separated by 
commas is a cedent; in the sequent above, AI, . . . , Ak is the antecedent and 
B,, . . . , B, is the succedent. 
A sequent calculus proof is a series of sequents; each sequent must either be an 
axiom or be derived by one of the rules of inference given below. To avoid 
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ambiguity, a proof also specifies explicitly how each sequent is derived by 
indicating which axiom or which rule and hypotheses are used. The size of a proof 
is the number of sequents in the proof. 
It is actually more common to treat sequent proofs as trees of sequents; 
however, we define them here to be sequences of sequents or, equivalently, 
directed acyclic graphs. The results below also show that the Main Theorem also 
applies to the sequent calculus using proof trees. A sequent proof is said to be 
tree-like if every occurrence of a sequent in the proof other than the endsequent is 
used exactly once as a hypothesis of an inference. Obviously any proof can be 
transformed into a tree-like proof by duplicating subproofs to derive intermediate 
results multiple times. 
The logical axioms are sequents of the form A-A. The equality axioms are 
sequents of the form + tl = tl or tl = tz+ t2 = tI or 
Sl=tl,. . .) Sk = tk, P(s,, . . . , Sk)‘P(tl, . . . , tk) 
or 
Sl'fl,.. * 9 Sk =tk-+f(h, . . . ,Sk)=f(fl,. . * , tk) 
where si and ti are terms, P is a k-ary predicate symbol and f is a k-ary function 
symbol. Since P may be equality (=), these axioms imply the transitivity of 
equality. 
Letting capital Greek letters r, A, II, A, . . . stand for cedents, the valid rules 
of inference are: 
deft 
A :right 
A deft 
v deft 
v :right 
2 deft 
x:right 
3:left 
Weft 
r+A,A 
1A, r+ A 
1:right 
A,r+A 
l-j A, 1A 
r+A,A r-A, B 
r*A,Ar\B 
A,r+=A B, I’+A 
AAB,r+A AAB,I’+A 
A, I--+A B,I’+A 
AvB,r+A 
l-‘+A,A r+A, B 
r+A,AvB r+A,AvB 
r+A,A B,r+A 
A>B,r+A 
A, T-A, B 
I’+A,AIB 
A(b), r+ A 
(3x) A(x), r+ A 
A(t), I-+ A 
(VX) A(x), r+ A 
3:right 
r+ A, A(t) 
I--, A, (3x) A(x) 
V:right 
r+ A, A(b) 
l-+ A, (Vx) A(x) 
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In the 3:left and V:right inferences the free variable b is called the eigenvariable 
and must not appear in the lower sequent. The variable x must be freely 
substitutable into A for all four quantifier inferences. 
Cut 
r+A,A A, 17-A 
Weakening 
r-A 
A,r+A r+A,A 
Exchange 
r,A, B, II-A r+A,A, B,A 
r, B,A, 17-A r-+A, B,A, A 
Contraction 
A,A, T-A r+A,A,A 
A, r+A r+A,A 
The final four types of rules, Cut through Contraction, are called structural 
inferences; the rest are called logical inferences. 
The principal formula of an inference is the formula in the lower sequent of the 
inference upon which the inference acted; for example, the V:left inference above 
has (VX) A(x) as principal formula. Note that cut inferences have no principal 
formula and exchange inferences have two principal formulas. The auxiliary 
formula(s) of an inference are the formulas in the upper sequent which are used 
by the inference - the rest of the formulas (in r, A, II, A) are the side formulas. 
The above completes the definition of the sequent calculus LK,. The system 
obtained by removing the equality symbol = and its associated initial sequents is 
called LK. 
We wish to develop a theory of how the influence of a formula spreads through 
a proof. This will be done by defining a directed graph called the logical flow 
graph’. The logical flow graph has as nodes the subformulas occurring in the 
proof. For convenience, suppose we have a fixed proof P in hand; we define an 
s-formula to be an occurrence of a subformula of a formula occurring in P. (The 
‘s-’ stands for ‘semi-’ or ‘sub-‘.) It should be stressed that an s-formula is an 
occurrence of a semiformula in a proof as compared to the semiformula itself 
which may occur many times in the proof. An s-formula A is a variant of B if A 
can be obtained from B by changing some of the semiterms in B. The logical flow 
graph (defined below) will have as nodes the s-formulas in P; two s-formulas will 
be connected by an edge only if they are variants of each other. Furthermore, any 
two s-formulas connected by an edge will be in (distinct) sequents of some 
inference or will both be in an axiom on opposite sides of the sequent arrow (+). 
We define the logical flow graph by specifying the edges: First, in an axiom 
A+A there is an edge directed from the left-hand A to the right-hand A. In an 
equality axiom 
sr = tl, . . .,sk =tk, P(sl, . . .7 Sk)+-P(t,, . . . , tk) 
*Concepts similar to our definition of logical flow graph have already been introduced by J.Y. 
Girard [3] who discusses tracing the flow of formulas through linear logic proofs. 
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there is an edge directed from the P(s) to the P(t). In all other equality axioms 
(and when P is equality in the above axiom), there is an edge from each formula 
in the antecedent to the formula in the succedent. Second, in any logical or 
structural inference listed above, there is an edge directed from the ith formula in 
the cedent denoted r or n in the lower sequent to the corresponding formula in 
the upper sequent. And, in each inference, there is an edge directed from the ith 
formula in the cedent denoted A or A in the upper sequent to the corresponding 
formula in the lower sequent. Third, in any inference if A (sometimes B) is an 
auxiliary formula which appears in the succedent of an upper sequent of the 
inference then there is an edge directed from that A (or B) to the corresponding 
s-formula in the lower sequent. And if A (sometimes B) is an auxiliary formula 
which appears in the antecedent of an upper sequent of an inference then there is 
an edge directed towards that A (or B) f ram the corresponding s-formula in the 
lower sequent. 
Before finishing the definition of the logical flow graph, lets illustrate two 
examples of the third part of the definition. In the ~:right inference there is an 
edge from the upper A to the lower A and an edge from the upper B to the lower 
B. In an 3:left there is an edge from the A(x) to the A(b). Note there is no edge 
directed away from the s-formula (3x) A(x). 
Fourth, in a cut inference there is an edge directed from the cut formula A in 
the succedent of the left-hand upper sequent to the occurrence of A in the 
antecedent of the right-hand upper sequent. 
Fifth and finally, suppose there is a directed edge from an s-formula A, to A2 
and suppose B1 is a subformula of Al. Since A, and A2 are variants there is a 
subformula B2 of A2 which corresponds to the subformula B, of A,; B1 and B2 
are, of course, variants. If B1 occurs positively in Al then there is an edge from 
B1 to B2. If B1 occurs negatively in Al then there is an edge directed from B2 to 
B1. Recall that B, occurs positively (negatively) in A if the B1 occurs an even 
(odd) number of times in the scope of a negation or in the left-hand operand of 
an implication. Of course B, occurs positively in Al if and only if B, occurs 
positively in AZ. 
The above concludes the definition of the logical flow graph. As an example 
consider the following proof: 
A-A 
lA,A-, B-B 
lA,A+B lA,B*B 
A+(~A)IB B+(~A)IB 
AvB+(lA)xB 
The logical flow graph restricted to the formulas A and B is shown below 
(edges for 1A and 1A ZI B are not shown): 
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Looking at just the subgraph for A, there is a path from the A in the final 
antecedent up to the logical axiom for A and back down to the A in the succedent 
of the endsequent. And there is a path of length two from the subformula A of 
the 1A introduced with a Weak :left inference. Although this is a very simple 
example, it should be clear that the logical flow graph traces the influence of A 
through the proof. 
The concept of the logical flow graph will be useful in the next section for 
proving lower bounds on the number of inferences in a proof. First a few more 
definitions and some lemmas must be established. 
Debition. An s-formula occurs positively if 
and either occurs positively in a formula in 
Otherwise the s-formula occurs negatively. 
and only if it is in a sequent r+ A 
A or negatively in a formula in I’. 
Definition. Let P be a proof and let E be an edge in the logical flow graph of P 
directed from A to B. Note that either (1) there is a unique common inference J 
containing both A and B such that J gave rise to E or (2) A and B are in an 
axiom. (There may be more than one inference containing both A and B but 
there is only one that caused E to be in the logical flow graph.) If A is in an upper 
sequent of J and B is in the lower sequent of J then we say E is a downward edge. 
If B is in an upper sequent and A in a lower sequent then E is an upward edge. If 
A and B are both in upper sequents (so J is a cut) or if A and B are in an axiom 
then E is a lateral edge. 
Proposition 4. Let P be a proof. Every downward edge connects two s-formulas 
which occurs positively. Every upward edge connects s-formulas which occur 
negatively. Every lateral edge is incident on an s-formula which occurs positively 
and on an s-formula which occurs negatively. 
Proposition 5. Let P be a proof and A an s-formula in P. 
(a) Suppose A occurs positively in P. Then each edge directed towards A in the 
logical flow graph is either lateral or downward; all incoming edges have the same 
direction. If the incident edges are downward, there may be 0, 1, or 2 of them. 
Furthermore, if P is tree-like, the outdegree of A in the logical flow graph will be 
one (or zero if A is in the endsequent or in a sequent not used in the proof). 
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(b) Suppose A occurs negatively in P. Then either there is one lateral edge 
directed away from A or there are up to two upward edges directed aways from A. 
Furthermore, if P is tree-like, the indegree of A will be one (or zero if A is in the 
endsequent or in a sequent not used in the proof). 
Propositions 4 and 5 are easily proved by examining the definition of the logical 
flow graph. For example, in Proposition 5 when A occurs positively, A will have 
lateral incoming edges only if A appears in an axiom. Otherwise the indegree is 
zero if and only if A is a subformula of a formula introduced by a weakening 
inference. The indegree is two if A is a subformula of a formula which is merged 
with an identical formula by a contraction, v:left or r\:right inference. There is 
one incoming downward edge in the other cases. Similar considerations apply to 
Proposition 5(b). 
For the rest of this section we shall let T be an abbreviation for some 
(arbitrary) valid formula and _L be an abbreviation for its negation. So T and I 
are formulas such that 4 T and I+ are LK-provable. We are not however 
adding these to our language for first-order logic; in particular, it is important 
for Proposition 6 and 10 that atomic formulas A and B are not T or 1. 
Definition. Given a proof P, a forward (respectively, backward) path is a 
non-trivial path in the logical flow graph of P which traverses edges in the foward 
(backward) direction. By path we always mean non-trivial path. The s-formula B 
is forward-reachable from the s-formula A if and only if B is A or there is a 
forward path from A to B. B is backward-reachable from A if A is forward- 
reachable from B. 
Proposition 6. Let P be a proof of T * A and let A be an atomic s-formula 
appearing negatively (respectively, positively) in I-‘+ A such that A does not have 
equals (=) as its relation symbol. Then either there is a forward (respectively, 
backward) path from A to another s-formula B in T+ A or the sequent I’*+ A* 
obtained by replacing A with T (respectively, I) is valid. 
The gist of Proposition 6 is that if A occurs negatively in I’+ A and is essential 
to the validity of the sequent then there is a forward path from A back to another 
s-formula B in I’-, A; note that B must occur positively in I’+ A. Note that this 
proposition implies the elementary fact that if B is a valid formula and if a 
predicate symbol Q appears only positively in B then every atomic subformula 
Q(. . -) of B may be replaced by I and the resulting formula will still be valid. 
This fact has a simple model-theoretic proof; Proposition 6 gives a proof-theoretic 
proof. 
Proof of Proposition 6. We shall only treat the case of A occurring negatively; 
the other case is handled similarly. Suppose there is no forward path from A back 
to the endsequent. 
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Claim. There is a tree-like proof PI of r + A such that in the logical flow graph of 
PI there is no forward path from A to another s-formula in I-+ A. 
Proof of Claim. PI is formed by converting P to a tree-like proof in the following 
manner: Find the first sequent in P which is used multiple times as a hypothesis 
and duplicate the subproof of this sequent as necessary to remove the multiple 
usage of that sequent. Iterate this process until a tree-like proof is obtained. It is 
easy to see that this transformation can not create a new path from A back to the 
endsequent (although if such a path existed it might be destroyed). This proves 
the claim. 0 Claim 
Since A is atomic, it is of the form Q(s,, . . . , sk) for some predicate symbol Q. 
Form P2 from PI by replacing every s-formula forward-reachable from A by T. To 
prove Proposition 6 it suffices to show that the endsequent of Pz is valid. To 
accomplish this we show that P2 can be modified to be a correct proof. There are 
several ways in which P2 migh fail to be a proof: First, an equality axiom 
forward-reachable from A might have been changed to (for example): 
rI=tl,. . . ,rk=tk, T-T. 
This is not longer an axiom, but it is valid; indeed, + T is valid. Second, where 
PI had a contraction, p2 might contain (for example): 
l-j A, C’, C” 
where C’, C” and C* are obtained from a formula C replacing some subformulas 
of the form Q(* - *) by T . If a subformula Q(* . -) is negatively occurring in C and 
it is replaced by T in any one of the formulas C’, c” or C* then it will also be 
replaced by T in all three of them; this is because PI is tree-like and the only 
edges in the logical flow graph of PI directed towards the occurrences of 
negatively occurring subformulas of C’ and c” come from the corresponding 
subformulas of C*. Furthermore if Q(* . -) is a positively occurring subformula of 
C and is replaced by T in either C’ or C” then it will also be replaced in C*. Thus 
C* can be obtained from either one of C’ and c” by changing some positively 
occurring subformulas to T. It follows that C’ 3 C* and c” 3 C* are valid. Hence 
the above ‘inference’ in P2 is sound. Third, v:right and A :left inferences contain 
implicit contractions of the side formulas; these are handled in the same way as 
contractions. Because P2 is tree-like, these three cases are the only way in which 
P2 can fail to be a valid proof and its final sequent must be valid. (Note that if P, 
contains an inference 
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then a negatively occurring s-formula in r+ A is forward-reachable from A only 
via a path which goes through II+ A. This will not necessarily be true of a 
non-tree-like proof3.) •i Proposition 6 
Proposition 7. Let P be a proof and A v B be an s-formula occurring negatively in 
the emisequent T+ A of P. Then at least one of the following holds: 
(a) There is a forward path from A v B to another s-formula in T+ A. 
(b) There is an v:left inference with principal formula A* v B* forward- 
reachable from A v B. 
(c) P+ A is still valid after A v B is replaced by T. 
There is a dual version of Proposition 7 regarding A A B occurring positively in 
T; it is stated with ‘backward’, ‘~:right’, and ‘I replacing ‘forward’, ‘v:left’ 
and ‘T’. 
Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose there is no forward path from A v B back to the 
endsequent and that there is no v:left inference satisfying (b). We show that the 
result of changing A v B to T in r+= A is valid-the proof is similar to the proof 
of Proposition 6. First form a tree-like proof PI of r+ A by duplicating subproofs 
of PI as necessary. There will still be no forward path from A v B back to the 
endsequent and no inference satisfying (b). Now form P2 from PI by replacing 
every s-formula forward-reachable from A v B with T. Just as in the proof of 
Proposition 6 every ‘inference’ in P2 is valid and hence the endsequent of Pz is 
valid. 0 
Propositions 6 and 7 are special cases of the following more general result. 
Proposition 8. Let P be a proof and A an s-formula occurring negatively 
(respectively, positively) in the endsequent P+ A of P. Then (at least) one of the 
following hola!s: 
(a) There is a forward (respectively, backward) path from A to another 
s-formula in T+ A. 
(b) There is an s-formula forward- (respectively, backward-) reachable from A 
which is the principal formula of a logical inference. 
(c) r+ A is still valid if the s-formula A is replaced by T (respectively, I). 
Basically, Proposition 8 states that if an s-formula A of r+ A is not used in an 
essential way in the proof of r+ A then r+ A maybe weakened by changing A 
to T or I as appropriate and still remain valid. The proof of Proposition 8 is 
similar to the proofs Propositions 6 and 7 and is omitted. 
The next proposition gives a related result for negatively occurring s-formulas 
which are conjunctions. 
3 Our construction works for non-tree-like proofs as well, but the proof is less clear. 
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Proposition 9. Let P be a proof and A A B be an s-formula occurring negatively in 
the e&sequent P+ A of P. Then at least one of the following holds: 
(a) There is a forward path from A A B to another s-formula in T+ A. 
(b) There are at least two r\:left inferences with principal formulas forward- 
reachable from A A B. 
(c) P+ A is still valid if A A B is replaced by A. 
(d) r+ A is still valid if A A B is replaced by B. 
Again there is a dual version of Proposition 9 regarding an s-formula A v B 
occurring negatively in the endsequent of P. 
Proof of Proposition 9. Suppose that neither (a) nor (b) hold and that the only (if 
any) A :left inference with principal formula forward-reachable from A A B is of 
the form 
A*, II+ A 
A* A B*, 17-n 
(The case where B* appears in the upper sequent instead of A* is handled 
similarly.) Obtain a tree-like proof PI of r + A by duplicating subproofs of P as 
necessary. As before, there will be no forward path from A A B back to the 
endsequent of PI. Also, every A :Zeft inference with principal formula forward- 
reachable from A A B will be identical to the one in P. Now form P2 from PI by 
replacing each s-formula A’ A B’ forward-reachable from A A B by A’. P2 can fail 
to be a proof in several ways: First, the ~:right inference will become 
A*, II+A 
A*, II+A 
which is clearly a valid ‘inference’. Second, a contraction of a formula C in PI 
may become an ‘inference’ of the form (for example): 
II-n, C’, C’ 
Il+A,C* ’ 
Here C’, C” and C* are formed by replacing some subformulas of the form 
Ai A Bi by A,. Now if Ai A Bi is a negatively occurring subformula of C which is 
replaced by Ai in any one of C’, C” or C* then it will be replaced by Ai in all 
three formulas; this is because PI is tree-like and the only edges in the logical flow 
graph directed towards a negatively occurring subformula in the upper sequent 
come from the lower sequent of the contraction inference. If Ai A Bi is a 
positively occurring subformula of C and it is replaced by Ai in either C’ or C”, 
then it is also replaced by Ai in C*. Thus C* can be obtained from C’ by 
replacing some positively occurring subformulas of the form Ai A Bi by Ai; hence 
C’ 2 C* is valid. Similarly, C” 3 C* is valid. Hence the above ‘inference’ in P2 is 
valid. The implicit contractions of side formulas in v:left and ~:right inferences 
are handled the same way. Hence final sequent of P2 is valid. 0 
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Suppose A v B occurs negatively in the endsequent r+ A of a proof P with A 
and B atomic formulas not involving equality. According to Proposition 6, under 
certain circumstances there are forward paths nA and .7dB from A and B back to 
the endsequent. We shall say that the two paths parallel each other for as long as 
they travel together along a path from A v B. Of course there may be no path 
from A v B back to the endsequent and nA and ads may be forced to stop 
paralleling each other and diverge at an v:left inference. The next proposition 
states sufficient conditions for there to be paths JCA and ng that parallel each other 
until an v :left inference separates them. 
Proposition 10. Suppose P is a proof with endsequent r-, A and A v B is a 
negatively occurring s-formula in P-+ A with A and B atomic formulas not 
involving the equal@ sign. Then at least one of the following holds: 
(a) There is a forward path form A v B back to I’+ A. 
(b) There are forward paths xA and JC~ from A and B, respectively, back to 
T+ A such that xA and nB parallel each other until they diverge at an v :left 
inference. 
(c) r+ A is still valid after A v B is replaced by T. 
Proof. As usual, it will suffice to prove the theorem for the cut-free proof PI 
obtained by duplicating subproofs of P as necessary. This is because any path in 
PI can be mapped back down to a path in P. It will suffice to show that there is an 
v :left inference 
A*, II+A B*, 17-A 
A* v B*, II-+/I 
in PI with a forward path from A v B to A* v B* and with forward paths from A* 
and from B* back to r* A. So suppose not. For each v:left inference of the 
form above with principal inference forward-reachable from A v B, if no path 
exists from A* (respectively, B*) to r + A, replace A* (respectively B*) and 
every s-formula forward-reachable from it by T. And replace every s-formula 
forward-reachable from the A v B in r by T. The same argument used for 
proving Propositions 6 and 7 shows that this transforms PI into a valid ‘proof; 
note that the inference displayed above will become vacuous with one of its upper 
sequents equal to the lower sequent. Unless (a) holds, the resulting endsequent is 
r+ A with the s-formula A v B replaced by T. Cl 
4. The undecidability proof for k-provability 
We shall first prove Main Theorem 1 for the system LK with no equality 
axioms. To do this, we reduce the second-order unification problem with partial 
substitution problem to the k-provability problem for LK. Given a second-order 
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unification problem satisfying the special restriction consisting of equations 
Pi,(Pjllai,) = Oj 
forj=l,. . . , m, we shall produce a formula @ and an integer N such that + Qi 
has a proof of GN lines if and only if the unification problem has a solution. The 
formula @ will always be valid and have a very straightforward proof; however, a 
solution to the unification problem will give a slightly shorter proof (in terms of 
number of sequents in the proof). 
Recall that the pi’s are second-order variables, ai’s are first-order variables and 
pi and oj are terms involving &‘s, ai’s and function and constant symbols. We 
shall also use the pi’s as bound variables in the sequent calculus. Let Uj be the 
semiformula 
c(Uj, pj) V q(pi,, a,,) V c(Zf, bf) V q(Zf, b;) V q(ZT, 67) V 4(Z4, 6;) 
where 5 is a binary relation symbol and zf, . . . , z; are new bound variables and 
b,!, . . . , b; are new free variables. (We adopt the convention that conjunction 
and disjunction always associate from right to left.) Then @ is the formula 
( 
vz: vz: * -vz;vz;vp,- * vPk ,& q) = (,c % 3x 4(x7 Y)) 
where /&,...,/& are the second-order variables appearing in the unification 
problem. 
By Theorem 3 we need only consider unification problems of the form 
52 u {& = S”O}; note that in this case, @ can be written as A(S”0) where A(x) 
depends only on 52. 
@ is obviously a valid formula; the question is what the minimum size proof of 
Qi is. Lets begin by outlining a (non-optimal) proof of @. For arbitrary terms 
r1, . . . , tk, r;, . . . , r-k let U(t, r) be the result of substituting the tls for the pi’s 
and the 4’s for the z$“s in Uj. Then -+ @ will be derived by k + 4m V:left 
inferences and one ~:right inference from 
K 4(6 r)+,fir 3Y 3x <(x9 Y). 
j=l 
This can be derived from the m sequents 
uj(t, r, + 3.Y 3X pj(x9 Y) 
by m - 1 A :right inferences and 2(m - 1) A deft inferences; this derivation begins 
with 
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and continues this pattern M - 1 times. Now Uj(& r) is of the form 
z+i*, pi*) v S(&,, Ui,) v 4(ri’, bf) v S(l,“, b;) v e:.<r;, bj) v S(ri”, b;) 
where p,? and o,? are the terms obtained from pj and uj after the BiBi’s are changed 
to ti’s. The sequent Uj(t, r) + 3y 3~ 5(X, y) can be derived by using five v deft 
inferences to combine sequents of the form P(v, w)+ 3y 3x 4(x, y). These latter 
sequents, of course, have simple proofs, each containing one logical axiom and 
two 3:left inferences. This proof of ~j(t, r)--, 3y 3x 4(x, y) has exactly 23 
sequents (all distinct since, because of the special restriction, p,? will not be equal 
to ail or any 6;). 
Counting the number of inferences and axioms in the above proof of @ we see 
that there are (k + 4m + 1) + (3m - 3) + 23m sequents. So the proof of @ has 
k + 30m - 2 sequents. However, this proof of @ is not the most efficient proof. 
Suppose the terms t are chosen so that setting /3i = ti provides a solution to 
for some particular value of j. Since this equation is satisfied, there must be some 
set S of occurrences of aj, in ti, such that changing each ai,, in S to p,? yields the 
term o,!. Let V(W) denote the result of substituting w into ti, for each ai, E S. Thus 
v(pT) = a;. If we further suppose that the terms ri are equal to v(bj) for 
i = 1, 2, 3, 4 there is a shorter derivation of the sequent Vi+ 3y 3x 4(.x, y): First 
derive the six sequents 
Wi*, pi*)+ 3Y W(Y), Y), 
e(t,7 ui,)+ 3Y 4(v(Y), Y), 
qr;, bj)+ 3Y q4y )t Y ). 
This takes a total of six inferences and six logical axioms. Then use five v:left 
inferences to derive Uj+ 3y Pj(u(y), y). Finally use the following four inferences 
and one logical axiom: 
e(v(u), u)* pj(v(u), u) 
lgv(u), a)+ 3x qx, a) 
q+ 3Y W(Y)9 Y) 3Y f+(Y), Y)_ 3Y 3 4(x, Y) 
Uj + 3_V 3X 4(X, Y) 
where a is a free variable not occurring in t;,. This derivation of Ui+ 
3y 3x 4(x, y) contains 22 sequents, one less than the earlier derivation which had 
23 sequents. 
If the second-order unification has a solution, then by appropriate choices for 
the tj’s and rj’s, the formula @ can be proved with a proof containing 
(k + 4m + 1) + (3m - 3) + 22m = k + 29m - 2 sequents. So we let N be k + 
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29m - 2; we need to show that if the unification problem has no solution then any 
proof of @ requires at least N + 1 lines. (However, if there is a solution to all but 
one of the unification equations, @ will have a proof of exactly N + 1 lines.) 
Suppose P is a proof of @. We say that a term t is assigned to /Ii in P if there is 
an inference in P of the form 
A(t), r+ A 
(VP,) A(&), r-, A 
such that there is a forward path from the s-formula Vpi . - . V/3, A Uj in the 
endsequent o the (VP,) A(&) in the inference displayed above. We call such an 
inference a term-assigning inference and its lower sequent is called a term- 
assigning sequent. Of course, more than one t may be assigned to Bi in P. 
By Propositions 7 through 9, P must contain at least one D:right inference, 
k + 4m V:left inferences, m - 1 A :right inferences, 2m - 2 A :left inferences and 
5m v:left inferences. Since any sequent is derived by a unique inference this 
accounts for k + 12m - 2 sequents in P. (Note that we also know there are at 
least 2m 3:left inferences in P; however, these will be counted separately below.) 
To further count sequents in P we will form m + 1 disjoint classes S,, . . . , S, and 
XS of sequents such that no member of these classes is one of the k + 12m - 2 
sequents already accounted for. Nor will these classes contain any term-assigning 
sequent. The idea is that Sj is the set of sequents used to handle the derivation of 
although, in general, the proof P might not actually contain this sequent. The set 
XS will be a set of ‘excess sequents’. 
Claim. The classes S,, . . . , S,,, and XS can be defined so that the cardinality of 
each Sj is at least 17 and so that if each Sj has cardinality exactly 17 and if XS is 
empty then there are terms t,, . . . , tk assigned to PI, . . . , Pk so that 
where pi* and o,! are obtained from pj and oj by replacing each pi by ti for all i. 
Before proving the claim, let us show that it suffices to prove the Main 
Theorem 1. If the Sj’s have cardinality 17 and are disjoint, the proof P has 
(k + 12m - 2) + 17m sequents which have already been accounted for or are in 
the Sj’s. In order to have exactly N = k + 29m - 2 sequents this must be all of the 
sequents of P; this implies that there are no excess sequents and XS is empty and 
there is exactly one term assigned to pi for each i = 1, . . . , k. That is because no 
S contains a term-assigning sequent and we only counted one term-assigning 
inference for each value of i. Now, by the Claim, the terms assigned to the pi’s 
provide a solution to the second-order unification problem. If, on the other hand, 
XS is nonempty or any Sj contains more than 17 sequents or any pi is assigned 
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more than one term, then P has more then N lines. Thus we have established that 
+ @ has a proof of GN if and only if the unification problem has a solution. 
It remains to prove the Claim. Fix for the moment a value for j. In @there are 
six atomic subformulas of the form Pj(- . -) on the left-hand side of the implication 
1 and only one on the right-hand side. Let 2ri = ui, w1 = pi, V* = pi,, w, = ail, 
v~+~ = zi, w~+~ = bj; so the six atomic subformulas on the right are e(q, wJ for 
1 G i c 6. (We are suppressing a second subscript, j, on the n’s and w’s to avoid 
excessive notation.) By Proposition 7, there exists at least one forward path from 
each s(vi, w,) on the left to the Pj(X, y) on the right. We are going to choose six 
forward paths nip for i = 1, . . . , 6, from the s-formula q(q, wi) to 4:.(x, y). These 
paths must satisfy the following three restrictions: 
(Rl) The initial parts of the paths n,, . . . , n6 parakl each other for as long as 
possible-they diverge at v :left inferences. 
(R2) If q(q, z;) v - . . v Pj(r6, 2;) is an s-formula that paths q, . . . , n6 (i < 6) 
pass through while still paralleling each other then q’, . . . , t; are distinct 
semiterms. 
(R3) It is not possible to replace any one of the six paths by a shorter path and 
still have conditions (Rl) and (R2) hold. 
It is not immediately obvious that there are paths that satisfy the three conditions; 
it will suffice to show that there are paths that fulfill conditions (Rl) and (R2) 
since by shortening these paths one at a time until no further shortening is 
possible we obtain paths satisfying all three conditions. 
Proposition 11. Fix j and let P be a proof of @. In P’s logicalflow graph, there are 
six paths q from q(vi, WJ to <(x, y) that satisfy conditions (Rl) and (R2)). 
Proof. As usual it will suffice to assume P is tree-like; otherwise, P may be 
transformed into a tree-like proof and paths in the logical flow graph of the 
tree-like proof can be mapped back to paths in P’s logical flow graph. Suppose 
that there is no set of six paths that satisfy (Rl) and (R2). We shall show below 
that there is an L&-proof P* of the formula @* obtained from @ by replacing Ui 
either with T or with 
A w, fw,. 
l~n<s~6 
Recall that w,, . . . , w6 are distinct free variables and w1 = p,! is distinct from 
them by the special restriction. Therefore, @* is not valid and we have a 
contradiction. Thus our assumption that the six paths do not exist will be shown 
to be wrong. (Note that P* is an LK,-proof even though P may not involve 
identity.) 
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Consider the six subformulas 
Ai = $’ ~GJ,, w,) 
n=i 
of Uj occurring in the endsequent of P. If B is an s-formula in P forward- 
reachable from A, then B is of the form //z+ q(r,, r:); we say that B is RZbad if 
t: and tl are identical semiterms for some 12 # s. We say that a path in the logical 
flow graph is RZbad if some s-formula on the path is R2-bad. And an s-formula 
B forward-reachable from some Ai is R2-good if and only if there is a path from 
Ai to B which is not RZbad. (So RZgood is not the opposite of RZbud.) An 
s-formula B is RZborderline if it is RZbad and there is an edge in the logical flow 
graph from an R2-good formula to B. An s-formula q(-) is viable if there is a 
forward path from it to the 4(x, y) in the endsequent of P. 
We modify P to form P* by the following transformations: 
(1) If B is a maximal s-formula forward-reachable from one of the Aj’s such 
that one of B’s disjuncts is not viable, replace B by T. 
(2) Any remaining non-viable s-formulas Pj(-) are replaced by T. 
(3) Suppose that B is a maximal s-formula in P of the form 
with i s 5 and that B is not altered by (1) or (2). If B is not R2-good it is replaced 
by 
and if B is RZgood it is replaced by Bgood = A,,<, t: # t:. 
The first two transformations apply to meeting condition (Rl); compare with 
the proof of Proposition 10. The third transformation is used to handle condition 
(R2). We now claim that P* is a ‘proof’ in that every inference in P* is sound. 
There are several ways in which P* can fail to be a valid LK,-proof. Firstly, 
consider an inference in P of the form 
If Vi_, q(rn, t:) was replaced by T in P* then so is at least one of the indicated 
formulas in the upper sequents; thus this is a vacuous inference in P* with one of 
the upper sequents equal to the lower sequent. The subproof of the other upper 
sequent can be ignored or discarded since P is tree-like. Otherwise, If 
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Vi<,, Pj(tn, T:) is not R2-good then in P* the inference is replaced by 
e( rij tl)j II+ _A Vi<, q(Tn3 z:) /ji<n<s da # ri > IT+ A > 
which is a sound ‘inference’. And if Visn Pj(tn, t:) is RZgood we must treat the 
cases i < 5 and i = 5 separately. For i < 5, we have that the inference becomes 
q(ri, r:), II-, A r\i<n<s r:, # t;, II+ A 
/liGnss z:,# z;, l77-,A 
in P*; this inference is sound (with the left upper sequent unnecessary for the 
soundness). If i = 5, then by our hypothesis that there are no paths satisfying 
(Rl) and (R2) we must have that some s-formulas on the path from Pj(216, we) to 
q(r,, ti) were not viable. And because P is tree-like we were able to discard a 
subproof of P containing the inference under consideration; hence this inference 
is not needed in the proof P*. Secondly, P* will not be a correct proof at a 
sequent containing an RZborderline formula; such a sequent must be the upper 
sequent of a quantifier inference that causes an RZgood formula in the lower 
sequent to become RZbad in the upper sequent. But the formula Bbad is actually 
equivalent to Bgood when B is RZbad, because two of the semiterms -CA, ri are 
equal (n #s). Hence the ‘inference’ in P* is sound. Thirdly we have to consider 
contractions in P* that may be contracting unequal formulas (this is similar to the 
proofs of Propositions 6-10). Contractions can occur explicitly in contraction 
inferences and implicitly in v :feft and A :righr inferences. Suppose, for example, 
that P contains a contraction inference 
where B1 = B2 = B3 are three occurrences of the same formula. In P* this 
becomes 
17*-A*, B:, B; 
17*-A*, B; . 
Let Ci, Cz, C3 be corresponding (equal) subformulas of B1, B2, B,. Suppose 
each Ci is replaced by C,? in P* with at least one Ci # Cr. If C,, occurs positively 
in B, then there are edges in the logical flow graph from C1 and from Cz to C3 
and these are the only edges out of C1 and C2 (since P is tree-like) and the only 
edges into C3. Thus C3 is transformed to T by transformations (1) and (2) iff 
either (both) of C1 and C2 is (are). Also if one of Ci or C2 is RZgood then C3 is 
R2-good. If however, Ci is not RZgood we still have LK, k (C)bad 3 (Qgood. In 
all cases we have that LK, k Cl? 1 C: for i = 1, 2. On the other hand, if C,, occurs 
negatively in B, then the directions of the edges in the logical flow graph are 
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reversed. Thus if C3 is transformed to T by (1) or (2) then both C, and C2 are. 
Also, C3 is RZgood if and only if either (both) of C, and C2 is (are). In any case, 
we have that LK, k C; 3 C,! for i = 1, 2. By repeating this analysis for all 
appropriate subformulas C,, Cz, C3 of B1, BZ, B,, we have that LK, k B, 3 B3 
and LK3 k B2 2 B3. Hence this contraction ‘inference’ preserves validity and is 
sound. Cl Proposition 11 
Returning to the proof of our Main Theorem, we now need to establish the 
Claim. The general idea for proving the Claim is to attempt to associate three 
sequents in P with each path rri. If we are able to do this then we have 18 
sequents in Sj. However, we will not always be successful in finding three 
sequents per path n, -in these cases we must either associate more than three 
sequents with the other paths or find sequents which, although they can not be 
associated with just one of the paths, can be put in Sj. For example, we will often 
want to associate two sequents with each of the six paths and associate an 
additional five sequents with the paths as a group: this will yield 17 sequents in Sj. 
Fix two values 1~ i < n G 6 and consider ~ci and Ed,. Since ni and n,, both end at 
the 4(x, y) in @, there must be an s-formula t+!~ which is the first one in the path 
ni which is also in the path ?r”. Since ;n, is a shortest path (condition (R3)), r/.~ is
in addition the first s-formula on rrn which is also on n,. Furthermore, without 
loss of generality, jrGi and nn coincide from v onward. The s-formula q must be 
of the form Pj(tl, t2) for some semiterms t1 and t2. There are several 
possibilities to consider: 
Case (1). If I+!J occurs as a subformula of the formula (3y)(3x) q(x, y) then 
each path must contain two 3:right inferences to introduce the two existential 
quantifiers. Furthermore, both paths must pass through at least one axiom of the 
form q:.(. . -)+ e(. - 9) before the 3:right inferences. This associates three 
inferences with each of rri and n,,. 
Case (2). Other cases where t+!~ is in the scope of two or more quantifiers are 
handled similarly. 
Case (3). If ‘1’ occurs as a subformula of a formula of the form (3~) e(t, y) 
then by the reasoning above, each of Jci and Ed, has two sequents associated with 
it; namely, a logical axiom and an 3:right inference. We may assume that ni and 
Ed, are going downward as they reach r,0 (otherwise there are Cut inferences on ni 
and n,, where the paths turn upwards after going downward through the 3:right 
inferences). Now we claim that there must be at least five sequents on the paths 
after @ before the endsequent Qi is reached. Namely, one Cut inference to turn 
the paths upward again, one 3:left inference to strip off the (3y), one axiom to 
turn the path downward and two 3:right inference to put (3y)(3n) on. However, 
these five inferences cannot be associated with zri and n,, separately but must be 
shared among all six paths. 
We have argued that, in this case (3), each of 36, and x,, has two associated 
sequents and that there are five additional sequents which may be put into Sj. 
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This counting of sequents is in fact optimal; furthermore, to achieve this small 
number of sequents either some sort of unification must occur or there are excess 
sequents we can put in XS. Indeed at the beginning of the path xi is an s-formula 
q(vi, Wi) where Vi is a semiterm. Following (upwards) along ;rdi, various V:left 
inferences assign terms tl, . . . , t, to pl, . . . , Pm and assign terms to zj’s. We can 
assume that the process of V:left inferences assigning terms is uninterrupted by 
any downward path segments and therefore uninterupted by any inferences which 
introduce a quantifier; otherwise, the logical axiom and the Cut inferences used to 
change the direction of the path and the lower sequent of any quantifier 
introduction inference can be put in XS. Eventually, the V:left term-assigning 
inferences transform Vi into a term vi* with no bound variables. A similar process 
gives v,*. Now there must be a common term q(x) such that q(y) = VT and 
q(wJ = v,* if our lower bound on the number of sequents associated with ni and 
n,, is to be achieved. This is because only then can 3:right inferences transform 
q(v,*, Wi) and s(vz, w,) into (3~) q(r, y)-here r will be q(y). But because we 
are dealing with LK-proofs and there are no equality axioms, the only way to 
change a term is by quantifier inferences. The lower sequent of such quantifier 
inference can be put into XS. Thus we have shown that if Sj has cardinality 17 
then either there are sequents we can put in XS or the term assignments along the 
initial part of ni and n,, provide a solution to the unification equation 
Vi(WJWi) = 21”. 
Case (4). Other cases where q is e(r, y) for y a bound variable are handled 
similarly. 
Case (5). Finally we must consider the case where 1/, is a (sub)formula of the 
form q(r, t) where t is a term with no bound variables and r is a semiterm which 
may in general contain variables bound in the formula in which 1~ occurs. Since 
y # w, either rvi or w, must have been changed along the path from q(vi, wi) or 
q(v,, w,); we shall show that at least four sequents can be associated with the 
change from rvi or w, to t. Because ni and n,, parallel each other for as long as 
possible (by condition (Rl)), they will diverge at an v:left inference while 
travelling upwards. By condition (R2) at the v:left inference where the paths ni 
and 7r,, diverge, the s-formulas are s(VI, wi) and Pj(vA, w:) with wl #WA. Hence 
one of wi or w; must be changed to t: this requires a logical axiom to change the 
path direction downward, an 3:right or V:left inference to quantify the wi or w,, a 
Cut inference to turn back upwards, and another quantifier inference to remove 
the quantifier. (Here we use the fact that LK has no equality axioms.) These 
inferences and axiom give four sequents which can be associated with one of the 
paths and put into Si. 
The above concludes the analysis of the intersection of two paths Jci and Ed,. 
This analysis actually needs to be performed five times to merge all six paths for 
atomic s-formulas involving 4. This should be done by considering intersections 
first (in order of travel along the paths). The result is that either (a) there are at 
least three sequents associated with each path or if case (5) applies each time 
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there are four sequents associated with five of the paths, and hence there are 218 
total sequents to be put in Si, or (b) each path has at least two associated 
sequents and there are five additional ‘shared’ sequents. Also, if exactly 17 
sequents are in Sj, case (b) holds and P contains a ‘solution’ to Bi,(pj//U;,) = oj. 
It may appear that the Claim is now proved; however, there is a small gap in 
our argument so far: we still need to show that the Sj’s are disjoint. Unfortun- 
ately, the above argument does not work since the 3:right inferences in case (1) 
above and the first 3:right inference and the 3:left of case (3) might be put into 
more than one Sj. For instance, it may be that in case (3) the s-formula I& above 
occurs in a formula 
(32) (8(r, 2) v q*(r’, 2)) 
with j’ #j. And if the PjV(x, y) is a point where two paths for P,,(. - -) merge then 
we will have to put the 3:right and 3:left inferences which introduce and 
eliminate the (3~) into both S’j and Sj,. 
To fix this problem, we need to count the inferences which are necessary to 
introduce and eliminate the disjunction and put these into Sj,. Consider what 
happens along a path that leads to Pjr(z’, z). The path begins at the endsequent 
and must pass through an axiom of the form P,,(- . .)+ Pjz(- . 0) before reaching 
an v:right inference to introduce the disjunction. There is an additional v:left 
inference on each path leading to Pj(t, 2). This gives a total of three sequents 
which we can associate with the path leading to Pj.(r’, z) and which are put into 
S,,. Note we haven’t even counted inferences necessary to eliminate the 
disjunction. 
A similar and slightly more complicated argument works for the implication 
connective (I) replacing v ; we leave this to the reader. 
The case where a conjunction links q(. . -) and Pj,(. - *) is similar but more 
complicated. First along a forward path leading to Pj.(z’, z) there is an axiom and 
an ~:right inference; this provides only two sequents to be associated with the 
path and to be put into Sir. To eliminate the conjunction requires two r\:left 
inferences; there is also an axiom P,,(- . -)+ Pj,(* - -) and two 3:right inferences 
which introduce the quantifiers in the endsequent (i.e., in @). Furthermore, 
before reaching the endsequent, the subformula q(t, z) A Pj,(t’, z) must be split 
into two copies, one on the q-path and one on the Pj,-path (as in Proposition 9). 
Splitting into two can occur either (1) by a contruct:feft inference on an upward 
path, or (2) while on a downward path. The latter requires no extra inferences 
since it can be that the sequent is merely used twice as a hypothesis. However, in 
case (2), there are two Cut inferences required to turn upward towards the 
~:right inferences (because both copies of the conjunction need to be handled 
with a ~:feft). 
Thus there are at least six inferences associated with eliminating the conjunc- 
tion along the forward paths. These six sequents may be shared among the six 
paths for Pip and put into Sic. Thus Sj. will contain a total of 18 inferences. 
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So far we have discussed the very simple case of a formula with one binary 
connective linking two atomic subformulas Pj(* - -) and Pjr(* - -); however, in 
principle, arbitrary Boolean combinations of multiple predicates might occur. 
(Actually this will always be grossly inefficient, but we need merely find the 
requisite 18 sequents for each Sj.) Luckily, our technique extends to handling 
complicated formulas. In any Boolean formula with n atomic formulas there are 
n - 1 binary connectives. We set up a one-to-one correspondence between the 
binary connectives and n - 1 of the atomic subformulas by assigning a given 
binary connective to the first atomic subformula of its second operand. Now in a 
proof P of the sequent + @ if there is a formula with n - 1 binary connective and 
n atomic subformulas, for each atomic subformula Pj,(. . -) associated with one of 
the binary connectives we find three sequents to be associated with each path to 
the s-formula Pj,(. - -) by the analysis used above. For the one atomic subformula 
e(. * -) not associated with a binary connective we use the original analysis which 
found either 17 or 18 sequents to put in Sj. 
That completes the proof of the Claim and of Main Theorem 1. It remains to 
prove the Main Theorem for LK, the logical calculus for first-order logic with 
equality. 
Main Theorem 12. Let LK, be Gentzen’s sequent calculus with the nonlogical 
equality symbol, a unary function symbol S, a binary function symbol and 
infinitely many unary relation symbols. For every recursively enumerable set X 
there is a formula A(x) and an integer k such that for all n, n E X if and only if 
+A(S”O) has an LK,-proof with Sk distinct sequents. 
Proof. The proof is almost exactly like the proof of Main Theorem 1 except we 
need to modify @ somewhat so as to make sure that the equality axioms can’t 
help prove @. What is done is to replace every subformula of @ of the form q(-) 
by 
(0.. ((e(-) A T) A T) A * * * A T). 
where there are N disjunctions in this formula. (N is the same number as for the 
previous proof.) Since the equality axiom apply only to atomic formulas at least N 
A :left inferences would be needed to apply even one equality axiom to a formula 
containing a Pi. 0 
The proof above for LK, is somewhat unsatisfactory since it depend on the fact 
that equality axioms only apply to atomic formulas. It seems likely that the 
k-provability problem remains undecidable even for more general equality 
axioms. In connection with this let us state an open problem. Suppose a formula 
$ does not involve the equality symbol and has an LK,-proof of k lines; does # 
necessarily have a proof of Sk lines in which no equality symbol occurs? 
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5. Conclusion 
Our proof of the undecidability of the k-provability problem for the sequent 
calculus depended of course on the details of the definition of the sequent 
calculus; however, it doesn’t seem to exploit any unusual features of the sequent 
calculus. For LK,, our proof did exploit the fact that equality axioms only apply 
to atomic formulas; however, this is a common feature of many systems of 
first-order logic. Thus it seems reasonable that our method of proof might work 
for other systems of first-order logic. The main proviso is that the system of 
first-order logic should have some general version of cut or modus ponens and 
substitution axioms; Farmer [l] has proved decidability results for first-order 
proof systems with restricted substitution axioms and Orevkov [lo] and KrajiEek 
and Pudlak [6] show that the k-provability problem is decidable for the cut-free 
sequent calculus. (Recall that substitution axioms are of the form (VX) A I 
A(t/x); the V:left rule in the sequent calculus corresponds to the substitution 
axioms.) Another feature of the sequent calculus that our proof exploited is the 
fact that quantifier rules can only add or remove one quantifier at a time. 
Our original motivation for looking at the k-provability problem was to 
approach Kreisel’s problem. For this, we had hoped to show, for instance, that 
there is a formula +(x) such that each @(S”O) either has a proof of SIZ lines or 
has no proof with ~2” lines and such that it is undecidable which case holds. Such 
a result would likely be very useful in extending the undecidability of k-provability 
to other systems of first-order logic. It should be noted that there is no hope of 
proving such a result with 2” replaced by a function which grows faster than the 
superexponential function; this is because if there is a proof of IZ lines then there 
is a cut-free proof with number of lines bounded by a stack of O(n) 2’s and, as 
mentioned above, the k-provability problem for cut-free proofs is decidable. 
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